Abstract Telecare medical information systems (TMIS) aim to provide healthcare services remotely. Efficient and secure mechanism for authentication and key agreement is required in order to guarantee the security and privacy of patients in TMIS. Recently Amin et al. proposed an improved RSA based user authentication and session key agreement protocol for TMIS after demonstrating some security pitfalls in Giri et al.'s scheme. They claimed that their improved protocol overcomes the weakness of Giri et al.'s scheme and resists all known attacks. However, our analyses show that Amin et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to offline identity-password guessing attacks once the victim's card is compromised and does not provide perfect forward secrecy. Furthermore we propose a new ECC based anonymous authentication and key agreement scheme which is efficient and provides all security requirements.
Introduction
With the recent development in information science and communication technology, telecare medical information systems (TMIS) are widely used to provide remote healthcare services. By using TIMS, not only can patients receive desired treatments directly at home as they can establish communication with doctors over public Internet, which reduces their economic burdens, but also the hospitals can save precious resources such as beds and medical devices for other patients [28] . It may be noted that the only communication link between patients and doctors is the public Internet, which is insecure against various attacks such as eavesdroping, replaying and impersonating. What's more, the message exchanged between TIMS server and patients (e.g. blood pressure, heart rate, etc.) as well as the information stored in TMIS server (e.g. health records) should not be modified by the adversary since these data are crucial for doctors to make decisions. Any modification of them may cause a substantial injury or even risk the patient's life [17, 22] . In addition to traditional security requirements, user anonymity has become an important issue in TMIS, which enables a remote patient to get proper healthcare services without revealing his name or identity to the doctor. To maintain the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of data along with user anonymity, a secure authentication and key agreement scheme is usually employed for TIMS [2, 10, 5] .
Since Lamport [20] introduced the first password based authentication scheme in 1981 , lots of password only authentication schemes have been proposed to offer various levels of security for two-party setting [15] , three-party setting [14] , etc. Though such password only authentication schemes are relatively easy to implement, they suffer from two main threats: password stealing and password-table leakage [23] . In 1991, Chang et al. [4] proposed the first two factor authentication scheme combining the use of smart cards and passwords. Later on, there have been many two factor authentication schemes developed [13, 8, 19] , whose security largely relies on the tamper-proof property of the smart cards. Unfortunately, the recent developments in side-channel attacks (e.g., monitoring the power consumption [18, 21] ) make it possible to extract the smart card information stored in its memory. Thus the smart card can no longer be regarded as fully tamper-proof devices and it's desirable to design two factor authentication schemes based on the new assumption that smart cards are conditionally not tamper-proof [25] , which means that their physical security can be breached at the hands of attackers for a sufficiently long time (e.g., a few hours) for performing side-channel attacks.
In 2012, Wu et al. [27] proposed a DLP based authentication and key agreement scheme for TMIS. However, He et al. [9] demonstrated that Wu et al.'s scheme was vulnerable to impersonation and privileged insider attacks, and also proposed an enhanced DLP based scheme for the same system requiring fewer exponentiation operations than Wu et al.'s scheme. Nevertheless, Wei et al. [26] pointed out that both Wu et al.'s scheme and He et al.'s scheme suffered from offline password guessing attacks. Furthermore, Wei et al. proposed an improved authentication scheme for TMIS against offline password guessing attacks. Unfortunately, it was proved by Zhu [29] that Wei et al.s scheme was similar to the previous schemes and was still vulnerable to offline guessing attacks. In addition, Zhu proposed a new RSA based authentication scheme. But several security weaknesses such as vulnerable to parallel attacks and denial-of-service attacks were showed by Khan et al. [16] on Zhus scheme in 2013. And Khan et al. also proposed an improved scheme.
Recently, Giri et al. [7] illustrated that the Khan et al.'s scheme was insecure against offline password guessing attacks and also didn't provide user A secure one way hash function A → B : C message C is transferred over a public channel from A to B A ⇒ B : C message C is transferred over a secure channel from A to B anonymity. They proposed an improved scheme to overcome the mentioned weaknesses. But their goals were not achieved, which was pointed out by Amin et al. [1] that their scheme was still vulnerable to offline guessing attacks as well as no providing user anonymity. After that, Amin et al. proposed an improved scheme over Giri et al.'s. However, our analyses in this paper reveal that Amin et al.'s scheme is also vulnerable to offline identity-password guessing attacks once the victim's card is compromised, and does not provide perfect forward secrecy, which is an important security requirement for protocols. Then we propose a new ECC based two factor anonymous authentication and key agreement scheme. The proposed scheme not only achieves all security requirements, but also has better performance than previous schemes. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review Amin et al.'s scheme; In Section 3 we present the security weaknesses of Amin et al.'s scheme; In Section 4 we propose our ECC based anonymous authentication and key agreement scheme; In Section 5 and Section 6 we summarize the comparative security and performance analysis; We conclude the paper in Section 7.
Review of Amin et al.'s scheme
In this section, we will briefly review Amin et al.'s RSA based two factor scheme for TMIS [1] . The definition of notations used in Amin et al.'s scheme is summarized in Table 1 and the scheme is illustrated in Fig.1 , which consists of the following phases:
Initialization phase
To initialize, TIMS server S chooses two large primes p, q and computes n = pq. Then S chooses a secure one way hash function h(·) : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l as well as two integers e and d such that ed ≡ 1 mod (p − 1)(q − 1). Finally, S publishes (e, n) as its public key and keeps d secretly.
Registration phase
The steps of the registration phase in Amin et al.'s scheme are presented below:
Step R1: U i chooses his identity ID i , password pw i ;
Step R2: U i chooses a random number b i and computes pwb i = h(pw i b i );
Step R3:
Step R4: Upon receiving the registration message
Step R5: S ⇒ U i : A smart card containing security parameters {A i , L i , n, e, h(·)};
Step R6: Upon receiving the smart card, U i computes DP = h(ID i pw i ) ⊕ b i and stores DP in the memory of the smart card.
Login phase
In this phase, U i inserts his smart card to the card reader and keys in ID i and pw i . The smart card executes the following operations:
Step L1: The smart card retrieves b
Then the smart card checks whether L ′ i is equal to the stored L i or not. If they are unequal, the smart card rejects the session, otherwise chooses a random number N 1 and computes
e mod n; Step L2:
Authentication and session key agreement phase
After receiving the login request from U i , the following operations are performed between S and U i to achieve mutual authentication and session key agreement:
Step A1: S decrypts B i using the private key d as 
Step A3: On receiving the reply message
) and then matches K ′ i with the received K i . If they are equal, S and U i are mutually authenticated. After that, U i computes the session key SK = h(ID i pwb
Step A4: U i → S : {SKV };
Step A5:
and checks whether SKV ′ = SKV or not. If it holds, S and U i agree upon a secret session key SK for secure communication.
Password change phase
In this phase, U i changes his password pw i to a new one pw new i without interacting with the server S through the following steps:
Step P1: U i inserts his smart card into a card reader and enters his identity ID i and old password pw i and then submits a password change request.
Step P2: The smart card computes b 
Identity change phase
Since the phase has little relevance with our discussions, it is omitted here.
Security weaknesses of Amin et al.'s scheme
We make two widely accepted assumptions about the adversarys capabilities:
1. The adversary is in total control of the public communication channel between the user and TIMS server. That means the adversary can eavesdrop, modify, delete and resend any messages transmitted in the public channel. 2. If the adversary gets access to a user's smart card somehow, he gets all stored information of the smart card.
Under the above two assumptions, we show that Amin et al.'s scheme is insecure against offline identity-password guessing attacks and does not provide perfect forward secrecy in this section.
Offline identity-password guessing attacks
Suppose an adversary A gets the smart card of a legal user U i by some means, he knows the parameters {DP, A i , L i } stored in the smart card by assumption 2. Further according to assumption 1, A has also intercepted the message {C i , B i , D i } exchanged in the login phase of one normal session. Then A can guess ID i , pw i by the following steps:
where D ID and D pw denote the dictionary of the identity and the password respectively; 
) and checks whether C * i is equal to C i or not. If they are equal, it implies that A has selects the right pair (ID * i , pw * i ). Otherwise A repeats the above steps until succeeding.
Since the identity and password of each user have low entropy, A can enumerate all pairs (ID * i , pw * i ) within polynomial time. So Amin et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to offline identity-password guessing attacks.
Lack of perfect forward secrecy
An authentication and key agreement scheme is said to support perfect forward secrecy if the adversary A having obtained TIMS server's master secret key and the password pw i of a legal user U i is still not able to compute previously generated session keys. Amin et al.'s scheme does not provide perfect forward secrecy as A can compute previous session keys if he knows the secret key d:
The proposed scheme
In this section we propose a new ECC based anonymous authentication and key agreement scheme. Our scheme is composed of four phases: initialization phase, registration phase, login & authentication phase and password change phase. For ease of presentation, the definition of notations used is listed in Table 2 and the phases are described in the following subsections. Fig.2 illustrates the registration and authentication phase.
Initialization phase
In this phase, TIMS server S selects a prime number p and chooses an elliptic curve E/F p as well as a base point G. Then S selects a random integer x ∈ Z * p as its secret key and computes its public key Y = xG. Finally, S selects a secure one way hash function h(·) : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l and publishes (p, E/F p , G, Y, h(·)) as system parameters and keeps x secret.
Registration phase
This phase is meant to register a user U i with TIMS server S for which the following steps are performed over a secure channel:
Step 1: U i chooses his identity ID i ∈ {0, 1} l .
Step 2: U i ⇒ S : {ID i }.
Step 3: On receiving the registration request message from U i , S checks whether ID i exists in its database or not. If It already exists, S asks U i for a different identity. Then S computes the authenticator A i = h(ID i x) and stores ID i in its database.
Step 4: S ⇒ U i : A smart card containing (p, E/F p , G, Y, h(·), A i ) in its memory.
Step 5: On receiving the smart card, U i chooses a password pw i and replaces A i with B i = A i ⊕ h(pw i ) in the smart card.
Login & authentication phase
In this phase, the process of mutual authentication and key agreement are performed through the following steps over a public channel:
Step 1: U i inserts his smart card into a card reader and inputs ID i and pw i .
Step 2: The smart card selects a random integer a i ∈ Z * p and computes
where T 1 is the current timestamp.
Step 3:
Step 4: After receiving the message {Q i , C i , V 1 , T 1 }, S checks whether T 2 − T 1 ≤ ∆T S where T 2 is the current timestamp and ∆T S is the predetermined maximal time limit for transmission delay. If it doesn't hold, S termimates the session. Otherwise S computes K *
) and checks the validity of the identity ID * i as well as if h(Q i K * 1 h(ID * i x) T 1 ) are equal to the received V 1 . If either goes wrong, S stops the process. Then S selects a random integer a S ∈ Z * p and computes
where T 3 is the current timestamp.
Step 5: S → U i : {Q S , V 2 , T 3 }.
Step 6: Upon receiving the message {Q S , V 2 , T 3 }, U i checks whether
where T 4 is the current timestamp and ∆T i is the permitted time limit for transmission delay. If it doesn't hold, U i termimates the session. Otherwise 
is equal to the received V 2 or not. If they are not equal, U i stops the process. Then U i computes V 3 = h(K * 2 V 2 ) and the shared session key SK = h(ID i K * 2 ).
Step 7: U i → S : {V 3 }.
Step 8: S compares h(K 2 V 2 ) with the received V 3 and rejects if they are unequal.
Then S grants U i 's login request and computes the shared session key
Password change phase
In this phase, U i can change his password pw i to a new one pw 
Security analysis
In this section we informally analyse the security of the proposed scheme. It's showed that the proposed scheme not only is immune from offline identitypassword guessing attacks, privileged insider attacks, replay attacks, server impersonation attacks, user impersonation attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks, but also provides user anonymity and perfect forward secrecy. Table 3 illustrates the security comparison of the proposed scheme with some other schemes [16, 7, 1] .
Offline identity-password guessing attacks
We have assumed that each user's identity and password have low entropy, but an adversary can not successfully guess ID i or pw i offline if he steals U i 's smart card and extracts parameters in the memory, as the only parameter related to ID i or pw i is B i = h(pw i ) ⊕ h(ID i x), but he doesn't know x. The correct estimation of three values is infeasible in polynomial time [3] . Even if the adversary also eavesdropps all the previous message {Q i , C i , V 1 , T 1 , Q S , V 2 , T 3 , V 3 } during protocol execution, he is still not able to extract the correct ID i or pw i as he doesn't know K 1 . Accroding to the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption (CDH assumption [6] ), it's computationally intractable to compute K 1 = a i xG given Y = xG and Q i = a i G. Therefore the proposed scheme prevents offline identity-password guessing attacks.
Privileged insider attacks
During the registration phase of the proposed scheme, U i only sends his identity ID i to TIMS server but doesn't submit his password pw i . Besides, the messages sent to TIMS server in the login & authentication phase, namely {Q i , C i , V 1 , T 1 } and {V 3 }, has nothing to do with pw i . Therefore no privileged insider can obtain the user's password. In other words, the proposed scheme could withstand privileged insider attacks.
Replay attacks
The proposed scheme is secure against replay attacks. First, the timestamps are generated and verified both at the user and server side to ensure freshness of every new session. Furthermore, even if an adversary may replay the eavesdropped message {Q i , C i , V 1 , T 1 } within the permitted time limit for transmission delay, he cannot produce a valid response {V 3 } to the server's challenge message {Q S , V 2 , T 3 } since he does not know K 2 = a i a S G, which can not be computed given Q S = a S G and Q i = a i G. Therefore the proposed scheme resists replay attacks.
Server impersonation attacks
In the proposed scheme, an adversary can impersonate as legitimate TIMS server if he is able to produce a valid verification message V 2 to the users login request message {Q i , C i , V 1 , T 1 }. But the computation of V 2 involves K 1 = a i xG, which is unknown given Y = xG and Q i = a i G. Since the adversary does not know the server's master secret key x, he fails to impersonate a legal TIMS server.
User impersonation attacks
In the proposed scheme, an adversary can impersonate as a legal user U i if he is able to forge the messages {Q i , C i , V 1 , T 1 } and {V 3 }. The problem comes from C i which involves ID i and V 1 which can be computed by h(
while the adversary doesn't know ID i and pw i . Therefore the proposed scheme is secure against user impersonation attacks.
Man-in-the-middle attacks
It has been proven in the previous two subsections that the proposed scheme is secure against the user and server impersonation attacks, so man-in-themiddle attacks, which can only succeed if an adversary can pass through the authentication from the user and TIMS server, are impossible.
User anonymity
The proposed scheme ensures user anonymity. In the login & authentication phase U i 's identity ID i is not sent over a public channel but rather a pseudo identity C i , which is fresh for each session. ID i can only be revealed by using the server's master secret key x to get K 1 . Hence the proposed scheme provides user anonymity.
Perfect forward secrecy
In the proposed scheme, the session key SK = h(ID i K 2 ) where K 2 = a S a i G. The freshness of SK is guaranteed as U i chooses a new random a i and S selects a new random a S for each session. The adversary who has a knowledge of Q S = a S G, Q i = a i G, x and pw i is not able to compute the session key unless he knows the session specific a i or a S . Therefore the proposed scheme provides perfect forward secrecy.
Performance analysis
In this section we compare our proposed scheme with Amin et al.'s scheme [1] and other related schemes [16, 7] in terms of computation cost and size of exchanged message and smart card storage. The results are summarized is Table 4 .
In order to evaluate computation cost, we neglect the XOR and concatenation operations due to their minor costs and introduce the following notations:
1. T me : time for performing a modular exponentiation; According to [12, 11] , in average we have T me ≈ 522ms, T pm ≈ 63.075ms and T h ≈ 0.5ms. For comparison of size, we assume that the hash values and timestamps are 160 bits long and the key length of ECC is 160 bits while 1024 bits for RSA to achieve the equivalent level of security [24] .
In the registration phase the proposed scheme requires two hash function operations, so the computation cost is 2T h ≈ 1ms. In the login & authentication phase the proposed scheme requires six elliptic curve point multiplication operations and twelve hash function operations, so the computation cost is 6T pm + 12T h ≈ 384.45ms. The size of exchanged message in the login & authentication phase is 8 × 160 bits = 160 bytes ({Q i , C i , V 1 , T 1 , Q S , V 2 , T 3 , V 3 }) and of smart card storage is 4 × 160 bits = 80 bytes ({A i , p, G, Y }).
We can see from Table 3 that our proposed scheme resists all known attacks while others are vulnerable to various kinds of attacks, and our proposed scheme supports user anonymity and perfect forward secrecy while others may be in lack. Besides, Table 4 reveals that our proposed scheme is much faster in both the registration phase and login & authentication phase than others. For size comparison, except taking a relatively little bit more than Khan et al.'s scheme [16] in terms of exchanged message size, our proposed scheme is superior. Therefore, the proposed scheme is an eligible authentication and key agreement scheme for TMIS.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyse Amin et al.'s RSA based user authentication and session key agreement protocol for TMIS and show that it is insecure against offline identity-password guessing attacks as well as no providing perfect forward secrecy. In order to improve Amin et al.'s scheme, we propose a new ECC based anonymous authentication and key agreement scheme for TIMS. Detailed analyses confirm that the proposed scheme is robust against all known attacks and more efficient than previous schemes.
